Before proceeding, I remind the reader that parameters can be helpful summaries of underlying processes. Not only are they incomplete (as all models are), but they also can obscure the possibility that they may not have an underlying physical reality. A characteristic, such as loss aversion or number of thinking steps, may not correspond to an underlying neural structure or operation.
For example, what does a parameter, such as μ (or λ in Tversky and Kahneman's [1991] reference dependence model), suggest about loss aversion? Noting that μ i = 2.4 for consumer i helps make better predictions, but it does not reveal anything about the underlying causes of loss aversion. This value alone cannot communicate whether a lossaverse consumer is making a mistake or whether loss aversion is stable across attributes or situations. To be useful, a parameter must be fairly stable across some range of interest. Further research should address this issue for the kinds of parameters in Ho, Lim, and Camerer's (2006) How much agreement is there on the principles of behavioral economics? I often ask economist friends, What are the two or three big innovations of behavioral economics? What are the greatest hits? By this, I do not mean clever examples or cute, stylized facts, but rather what broadly applicable ideas exist that are useful in modeling. There is significant agreement. Ho, Lim, and Camerer (2006) identify and expound on three of the four winners of my informal survey: (1) reference dependence and loss aversion, (2) hyperbolic discounting, and (3) concerns about fairness. However, they do not discuss what many colleagues cite as a fourth major innovation: new ideas about risk and probability. Ho, Lim, and Camerer emphasize one issue that is often mentioned-limited cognition in competitive games-and, understandably, show great concern about principles that have been useful in game theory-namely, adaptation and learning and quantal (noisy) best-response models. The important lesson here
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might be hoped that risk attitudes are stable individual factors, in reality, they appear to change across situations and to have little stability.
An illustration of how parameters can and cannot summarize underlying stable individual differences can be found in work I have done with Colin Camerer, Sankar Sen, and Talia Rymon (see Johnson et al. 2002) . This work is relevant because it examines the number of thinking steps in conjunction with process-tracing data, which enabled us to observe how far ahead respondents looked. In this work, we documented that failures of the predicted subgame perfect equilibrium (Rubenstein 1982) were due, in part, to limited cognition. We found that people who failed to look ahead in the game (as measured by information acquisition in MouseLab) made different offers than those who looked further ahead. Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) suggest that the ability to look ahead is a parameter labeled τ. In our work, this parameter would have predicted offers in the bargaining game, and τ would have appeared to be stable over trials of the game. However, a couple of minutes of instruction to teach people to look ahead changed the results. Most people seemed to acquire the ability to look ahead or, in terms of the cognitive hierarchy approach, changed their τ for the better. Moreover, this seemed to transfer to other parameterizations of the same game. The question is, How general is this shift? Would it transfer to other games? Would it transfer to the ability to look ahead in real-world negotiations? This shift in parameters illustrates that such parameters depend on cognition, and assessments of learning and transfer would benefit from a good theory on how parameters summarize the underlying process. CostaGomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) and Gabaix and colleagues (in press) provide excellent examples of the simultaneous examination of process data and model fit. Similarly, at the individual level of analysis, choice processes are complicated. People use a large number of heuristics, switching among them throughout the course of even a single decision. Modeling this complexity in a choice model can be difficult. However, it would be useful to map this complexity onto the kinds of models that are used to predict choice.
Finally, marketing is also about intervention. In new product launches, it is important to know not only the degree of loss aversion but also how to change it. Although Gourville (2005) , for example, provides qualitative insights into the role of loss aversion, useful managerial models of new product design need to specify the degree of loss aversion for particular attributes, people, and situations. Because people are often bad at predicting their own happiness, it is probably the case that loss aversion in predicted utility is different from loss aversion in experienced utility.
People Differ
Often, in behavioral economists' quest to be almost as parsimonious as traditional economists, they anchor on the simplicity of an economic model and end up too close to the anchor. The classic move in economic modeling is the use of types. For example, as do many economists (Gabaix and Laibson, in press ; O'Donoghue and Rabin 2001), Ho, Lim, and Camerer (2006) suggest that there are two types of consumers with different insights into their discounting behavior: the naïf and the sophisticate.
A major concern of marketing is individual differences such as these, and it is tempting to substitute the word "segment" for the word "type" in Ho, Lim, and Camerer's (2006) example. Yet segments in and of themselves are simplifications, and reality may not be as cooperative. For example, a quick glance at Ho, Lim, and Camerer's (2006) Figure 1 shows a boxplot of the distribution of λ on the y-axis by knowledge and on the x-axis for one attribute, fuel consumption. The plots in Figure 1 lead to two observations: First, an average is insufficient to describe the range, and there is a lot of heterogeneity here. Second, an average obscures the significant relationship between the level of loss aversion and the knowledge of the respondent. Because the size of loss aversion seems closely related to knowledge, the interpretation of λ as a stable individual characteristic seems questionable. Indeed, much of the heterogeneity here is strongly related to knowledge of the attribute. Perhaps, it would be possible to change the degree of loss aversion by increasing knowledge of the attribute. Notably, modeling these sources of heterogeneity in the parameters of experimental economics seems to be an area in which estimation technology from marketing can be useful.
A particularly important question is whether firms engage in these behaviors: Are they loss averse, impatient, and concerned with fairness? For example, MBA students (whom most readers of this journal teach repeatedly) demonstrate these errors. A dose of forced humility is delivered to the teacher who teaches about limited cognition and then, at the end of the semester, gives students a similar problem in a slightly different guise. The question of how organizations can address these problems is important, but at least some evidence provided in Ho, Lim, and Camerer's (2006) Table 2 suggests that loss aversion exists in security markets, Boston condo prices, New York City cab drivers, and Capuchin monkeys. However, note that for both cab drivers and condo buyers, the effect of loss aversion is smaller for the more experienced participants.
THE TWO AND A HALF FIELDS OF MARKETING
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the behavioral economics enterprise in marketing is what Ho, Lim, and Camerer (2006) define as organization around tools. Although this seems true informally, I wonder how receptive the current set of marketing outlets would be for the joint product of, as they put it in their abstract, "modelers who prize formality and ... psychologists who prize realism." Figure 2 shows the pattern of citations among three aggregated groups of journals-psychology, economics, and an applied group called management-and three central 
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obvious trend over time is an increase in self-citations for Marketing Science.
Several observations follow from Figure 2 and the data (in parenthesis when the number is not in the figure) on which it is based:
•Marketing Science and Journal of Consumer Research have low levels of cross-citation (<1%). Furthermore, they are not cited by the managerial journals (<1%).
•Journal of Consumer Research has a greater dependence on the psychology journals than on other marketing journals.
•Marketing Science has low levels of input from economics (4.9%) and few citations within economics (<1%).
• The challenge for behavioral economics in marketing is that it might fall through the cracks. It could be a unifying approach to marketing problems, but at the same time, it could lack sufficient mass in any of the journals and their associated communities for cross-fertilization to occur. The skills required for behavioral economics include the willingness to express theories in mathematical formalisms and the ability to use behavioral research to make realistic assumptions. Perhaps the late Dick Wittink was prophetic in using Journal of Marketing Research to encourage this effort because this journal seems to be the nexus of the discipline. However, such foresight is not matched by the current state of the discipline. Behavioral economics' biggest challenge may be to foster the interplay between psychology-based and economics-based research in marketing, which is largely not visible in Figure 2 .
CONCLUSION
These principles are "plug-and-play" replacements for the assumptions of classical economics. They represent a shift, requiring slightly more complex models for a warranted increase in accuracy. This is important for an applied discipline such as marketing. It could be argued that the more applied the question, the more important these changes become, because application increases focus on veridical representations of behavior.
It might also be argued that complexity is unwarranted or too difficult and that the increase in complexity does not generate a sufficient return in accuracy. However, this argument misses the point that the cost of introducing complexity has significantly decreased. Just as technology has produced change in the kinds of data used and the types of studies run, it has also produced a significant shift in the ability to analyze formally complex models through the use of symbolic computational engines, simulation, and more sophisticated estimation procedures.
I began this comment with an old Scottish prayer that asks for protection from imagined "ghoulies" and "ghosties." Although Ho, Lim, and Camerer (2006) argue that students of formal modeling should not be afraid of ghoulies and should embrace this added complexity, they might also argue that more psychological researchers should not be afraid of the ghosties of formal models. As opposed to a verbal model, a formal model makes clearer and more easily falsified predictions. Moreover, the complexity in behavioral economics comes from robust behavioral principles and can be further informed by such insights. Finally, although simple frameworks are popular with managers (titles such as "The X Secrets of Solving Marketing Problem Y"), a unified theory of a phenomenon, even if it is quantitative, can have great communication value, particularly if the appropriate behavioral insights are captured.
To come full circle, the Scottish prayer that opens this commentary warns not only of "ghoulies and ghosties and long-leggedy beasties" but also of "the things that go bump in the night." Sometimes, if fears of the unknown paradigm can be overcome, those "things" may simply be the sound of good ideas.
